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INTRODUCTION 
Like many other federal agencies, during the past few years the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) has engaged in an orgy of reregulation, 
deregulation, and now unregulation. The basic assumption behind this exercise, 
of course, is that effective competition makes regulation unnecessary. Instead, 
competition among rational profit-maximizing entrepreneurs inevit~bly will 
produce consumer satisfaction.I This tenet in .turn leads to a regulatory 
imperative of creating - or at least encouraging -as much competition as 
possible within any industry. The role of governmental intervention is solely to 
create a "level playing field" on which firms can compete. 
Whether or not regulation can produce these market conditions is far from 
clear. As Representative Tim Wirth has quipped, "there's no such thing as a level 
playing field or airline food.112 Part of the problem, of course, is that 
government traditionally has two distinct - and basically inconsistent - ways of 
promoting competition. 
The first, and temptingly logical approach is simply to impose identical 
restrictions upon all potential players. This rationale is eminently fair, assuming 
that all potential players have reasonably comparable abilities. If they do not, 
however, this approach runs into both political and equitable problems. After 
all, the public and its representatives traditionally get a bit queasy at the sight 
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of a 240 pound professional football player landing on the back of a 140 pound 
high school athlete. As a result, it is tempting to adjust any game's rules in 
order to allow everyone to play. 
Precisely because of this very human - and very inefficient -tendency, 
the second and time-honored method of creating a level playing field is to rein in 
the most effective players. Common examples are handicaps for golfers, 
weights for jockeys, separation of professional from amateur athletes, and the 
like. Indeed, much of the New Deal's sometimes murky philosophy derived from 
this principle. This approach naturally is heresy to any ideologically pure 
deregulator, since it injects goverment into the marketplace. Nevertheless, it 
routinely creeps into admlnistratlva decisionmaking, because of demands for 
equity. Classic examples in telecommunications policy include the now deelasse 
anti-siphoning rules (which prevented cable or subscription television from 
competing with broadcast television to buy motion pictures as well as sporting 
events)3 and the still operational multipoint distribution service (MDS) rules 
(which prohibit an MDS operator from controlling more than half of its 
programming). 4 
The current, ideologically pure Commission purports to have used only the 
first approach in constructing a level playing field for the new video 
_ technologies. In most respects, this probably has been the case. N evertheless, it 
may be useful to test the Commission's premises, by analyzing the consistency of 
its current regulatory scheme. This paper thus reviews the FCC's policies as to 
the new video technologies in several different areas, including: ease of entry; 
ownership restrictions; jurisdictional bases; degree of federal preemption; and 
content regulation. These areas seem to merit consideration because they all 
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impact heavily upon each medium's ability to compete effectively with others. 
This classification scheme is suggestive rather than scientific, however, since no 
data currently are available as to the cost of different regulatory burdens for 
these media. Indeed, some of these media do not even exist, and the 
Commission's abolition of most reporting requirements will make it difficult to 
create accurate data bases in the future. 
This review considers only conventional broadcast television, cable 
television, multi-channel MDS (MMDS), subscription television (ST.V), low power 
television (LPTV), and direct broadcast satellites (DBS). The choice of these 
media obviously excludes several other electronic distribution systems. 
Videocassette recorders (VCRs) and videodisc players offer programming similar 
or even identical to that available over the other new video media - particularly 
in terms of pay programming. Since the Commission does not and can not 
regulate VCRs or disc players (except to prevent spurious radio frequency 
interference), however, there is little basis for comparing them to the other 
media in regulatory terms. Nevertheless, it is becoming increasingly apparent - 
particularly in nations. with high VCR penetration, such as England - that VCRs 
and discs compete with these other media for audiences. 
Similarly, the analysis does not consider services for distributing text or 
graphics - such as videotex and electronic games - rather than traditional video 
images. Although no dataseem to exist, these services also probably draw some 
viewers away from traditional video programming. After all, if a viewer plays a 
videogame or accesses a data base, he or she presumably is lost to conventional 
video program ming. Moreover, all of the new video media can off er data or 
graphics services, and apparently at least some plan to do so in the 
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comparatively near future. Nevertheless, at least the present experience 
indicates that these services will not compete substantially with any of the new 
video media. After all, at the extremes all forms of communication - including 
print or audio media - presumably have some competitive impact on each other. 
) 
Finally, some delivery systems simply are too new to evaluate in any 
significant fashion. For example, the Operational Fixed Service (OFS) might 
evolve into either a private or a mass medium. The Commission seems quite 
unclear about the ways in which OFS will develop. 5 
With these considerations in mind, it is appropriate to begin a perhaps 
pedestrian analysis of the Commission's regulatory approaches to the new video 
media. On many points, the most relevant observations involve not what the 
FCC has stated, but rather what it has failed to say. In these situations, of 
course, a certain amount of speculation as to the Commission's intent 
presumably is necesary. 
